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Abstract
Objective: Nosocomial outbreaks due to multidrug-resistant microorganisms in rehabilitation centers have rarely been reported. We report
an outbreak of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)–producing Klebsiella pneumoniae (ESBL-K. pneumoniae) on a single ward in a
rehabilitation center in Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Design: Outbreak description.
Setting: A 40-bed ward of a rehabilitation center in the Netherlands.
Methods: In October 2016, 2 patients were found to be colonized by genetically indistinguishable ESBL-K. pneumoniae isolates. Therefore, an
outbreak management team was installed, by whom a contact tracing plan was made. In addition to general outbreak measures, specific
measures were formulated to allow continuation of the rehabilitation process. Also, environmental cultures were taken. Multiple-locus
variable-number tandem-repeat analysis and amplification fragment-length polymorphism were used to determine strain relatedness.
Selected isolates were subjected to whole-genome multilocus sequence typing.
Results: The outbreak lasted 8 weeks. In total, 14 patients were colonized with an ESBL-K. pneumoniae, of whom 11 patients had an isolate
belonging to sequence type 307. Overall, 163 environmental cultures were taken. Several sites of a household washingmachine were repeatedly
found to be contaminated with the outbreak strain. This machine was used to wash lifting slings and patient clothing contaminated with feces.
The outbreak was contained after taking the machine temporarily out of service and implementing a reinforced and adapted protocol on the
use of this machine.
Conclusion: We conclude that in this outbreak, the route of transmission of the outbreak strain via the household washing machine played a
major role.
(Received 3 July 2019; accepted 8 October 2019; electronically published 5 November 2019)
Estimates on the prevalence of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase–
producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-E) carriage at hospital admis-
sion in the Netherlands range from 4.2% to 8.6%.1–5 Infections with
ESBL-E are associated with increased rates of morbidity and
mortality, increased treatment costs, and prolonged hospital
stays.6–8 Hence, healthcare-associated outbreaks with these micro-
organisms are feared. Many outbreaks in hospitals with ESBL-E
have been reported.9 Outbreaks in rehabilitation clinics, however,
have been reported less frequently. It is unclear whether these
outbreaks are indeed rare, whether they occur but remain unno-
ticed, or whether they are just not reported. Nevertheless, the
potential risk of nosocomial spread in rehabilitation centers is
expected to be high due to the presence of shared rooms and
patients sharing facilities and medical devices for a prolonged
period of time. In addition, the need for intensive personal care
and psychological vulnerability of rehabilitating patients challenge
the containment of outbreaks.
We report an outbreak of ESBL-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae
(ESBL-K. pneumoniae) that occurred in a rehabilitation center
in Rotterdam, Netherlands, in 2016. Our description focuses on
(1) the microbiological analysis including source identification and
(2) the outbreak measures taken in the context of the rehabilitation
setting.
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The Rijndam Rehabilitation Center specializes in complex reha-
bilitation and has 123 beds with 34,578 clinical admission days
in 2016. The outbreak took place on a 40-bed ward for patients
with spinal injuries and other complex chronic impairments.
Each week, 1–2 patients are newly admitted, with an average length
of stay of 79 days in 2016. The ward consists of 12 multiple-
occupancy rooms (4-bed rooms [n= 4] and 2-bed rooms [n= 8]),
8 single-occupancy rooms, 10 bathrooms, 1 room for physical and
occupational therapy, and 1 room for consuming meals and
recreation. Due to spinal cord injuries, many admitted patients
to this ward have a neurogenic bladder and bowel function and
are therefore at risk of incontinence for urine and feces. There is
no exchange of nurses, physicians and patients between wards.
Hand hygiene compliance rates on this ward from August to
December 2016 ranged from 69.5% to 76.2%.
Start of the outbreak
The outbreak investigation started in October 2016 with the
identification of 3 ESBL-K. pneumoniae isolates from clinical
cultures of 3 patients on the same ward. Multiple-locus variable
number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) and amplification
fragment-length polymorphism (AFLP) showed that 2 of the 3 iso-
lates had identical genotypes (the “outbreak strain”). This finding
led to the screening of 36 other patients admitted to the ward.
Among these, 7 additional patients colonized with an ESBL-K.
pneumoniae were identified, and 6 of the isolates were genetically
indistinguishable from the outbreak strain.
Case identification and definitions
A case was defined as a patient colonized or infected with ESBL-K.
pneumoniae, genetically indistinguishable from the outbreak strain
determined by MLVA and AFLP, isolated from any specimen
during the study period. Cases were identified by screening for
ESBL-E, using a rectal and throat swab from all patients, an
optional wound swab, and a urine sample if an indwelling urine
catheter was present. Patient data were retrospectively collected
from the electronic patient records of Rijndam Rehabilitation
Center and the laboratory information system of the department
of Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases of the Erasmus
MC University Medical Center (Erasmus MC).
Routine infection control measures
Infection control guidelines of Rijndam Rehabilitation Center are
based on the DutchWorking party for Infection Prevention (WIP)
guidelines.10 Patients colonized or infected with ESBL-E are placed
on contact precautions in a single room. Contact precautions
include wearing a disposable gown and gloves before touching a
patient or the patient’s immediate environment, in addition to
basic infection control measures, such as disinfection of hands
and wrists with alcohol-based hand rub according to ‘My Five
Moments for Hand Hygiene’ defined by the WHO.11
Microbiological methods
Sterile cotton swabs with Amies mediumwithout charcoal (Copan,
Brescia, Italy) were used for the ESBL-E screening cultures from
patients and the environment. The swabs were directly plated
on Brilliance ESBL agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and incubated
for 2 days. For culturing cotton cloths, tryptic soy broth (TSB)
with 50 mg/L vancomycin and 2 mg/L ceftazidime was used as a
selective-elective medium. After overnight incubation at 35°C,
10 μL broth was subcultured onto ESBL agar. Identification of
bacteria was performed with MALDI Biotyper (Bruker Daltonik
GMbH, Bremen, Germany). Susceptibility testing was performed
using VITEK2 (bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France), and clinical
break points were interpreted according to EUCAST guidelines
(bacteria version 6.0). ESBL production was confirmed in isolates
with reduced susceptibility to cefotaxime and/or ceftazidime
(minimum inhibitory concentration [MIC] >1 mg/L) using the
combination disk-diffusion method (ESBL þ AmpC Screen Kit;
Rosco Diagnostica, Taastrup, Denmark).
Molecular typing and clonal relatedness
We performed MLVA according to the method of Brink et al
(2014)12 with minor modifications, and we performed AFLP
according to the method of van Burgh et al13 with minor modifi-
cations. We used HpyCHIV4 and MseI restriction enzymes in
combination with a selective G residue for HpyCHIV4 and GG
for MseI. Selected ESBL-K. pneumoniae isolates from patients
and environment with identical MLVA and AFLP genotypes,
but with different susceptibility to gentamicin, were subjected to
whole-genome multilocus sequencing (wgMLST) on a MiSeq plat-
form generating 2 × 150 bp reads. Sequences were assembled using
CLC Genomic Workbench version 10.0.1 software (Qiagen
Bioinformatics, Venlo, Netherlands) and were subsequently
analyzed using SeqSphere software version 4.0.0 (Ridom GmbH,
Münster, Germany). The presence of plasmid sequences was evalu-
ated using the online Plasmidfinder tool.14 Resistance genes were
identified using the online Comprehensive Antibiotic Resistance
Database (CARD).15
Ethics statement
Written approval to perform this study was received from the
Medical Ethics Research Committee of the Erasmus MC (MEC-
2015-306) and from the research coordinator and director of
Rijndam Rehabilitation Center (2017FS050_2016FS039).
Results
Course of the outbreak and outbreak measures
The outbreak management team (OMT), composed of a clinical
microbiologist, an infection prevention practitioner, medical staff
from the ward, a communications consultant, and representatives
of the management board of the rehabilitation center, decided on
the following specific outbreak measures: (1) Environmental sam-
ples were obtained by swabbing designated sites in the direct
patient environment (ie, doorknobs, hand wash basins, light
switches, shower chairs, and shower mats) as well as in the therapy
and recreation room, kitchen, and staff rooms to identify possible
reservoirs for ESBL-K. pneumoniae. (2) The entire ward was
cleaned and thereafter disinfected using a chlorine-based disinfect-
ant 250 ppm (for large surfaces) or 70% alcohol (for small surfa-
ces). (3) Due to a limited number of single rooms, patients with
the outbreak strain were cohorted. Bedroom doors were provided
with instruction posters for contact precautions for healthcare
workers and visitors. (4) Patients who had been nursed in the same
room as an unexpected case (contact patients) and patients not
colonized with ESBL-E demonstrated by culture were screened
for colonization once weekly during the outbreak period.
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Awaiting results of the cultures, we did not isolate these contact
patients. (5) Because the outbreak measures were time-consuming
for the healthcare workers, we decided to stop admitting new
patients during the first 4 weeks of the outbreak. During this
period, 2 additional cases were identified, upon which extra
outbreak measures were taken. Audits of high-risk processes were
performed and infection control measures were reinforced follow-
ing observation of personnel on the ward by infection control
practitioners. In the following 6 weeks of weekly surveillance, no
additional cases were identified. The outbreak ended after 8 weeks,
after 3 weeks of no additional cases. Outbreak cases remained in
contact isolation—in private rooms when possible—as long as
they were admitted, despite any successive negative cultures.
Two weeks after the outbreak ended, the outbreak strain was unex-
pectedly found in an additional patient. This patient had missed
the previous 2 weekly monitoring cultures due to a hospital admis-
sion for 10 days because of a pneumonia. The OMT postulated that
this patient had acquired the outbreak strain previously, prior to
hospitalization, and that antibiotic treatment had resulted in
selection of the outbreak strain to a detectable level. Therefore,
no reinforced infection control measures were taken. Overall,
the outbreak strain was found in 11 patients (Fig. 1). Cases 1
and 2, from whom the outbreak strain had been recovered from
clinical samples, had clinical symptoms of infection (ie, urosepsis
and urinary tract infection). The other nine cases were considered
colonized. Three other patients carried a unique genotype
ESBL-K. pneumoniae.
Extended measures based on environmental cultures
In total, 163 environmental cultures were taken. Only the cultures
taken from a single household washing machine (designated
machine A) tested positive for the outbreak strain. The outbreak
strain was repeatedly cultured from the filter and inner surface
of this household washing machine (varioPerfect iQ700,
WM14S443NL, Siemens, Germany) present on the ward. When
this result was presented in the OMT, it became clear that the reha-
bilitation center applied a “no-absorbent material or diaper policy”
to reduce the risk of developing pressure ulcers. Consequently,
lifting slings and patient clothing were frequently soiled with feces,
which were washed in machine A, with a laundry detergent
without activated oxygen bleach (AOB) often at low temperatures
(ie, 30–40°C), despite the existing protocol demanding a minimal
temperature of 60°C. The clothing was air dried in an unventilated
room. The OMT decided on taking this machine temporarily out
of service. In addition, samples of another household washing
machine (designated machine B) present on the ward (used for
washing non–feces-contaminated personal clothing) and a
professional washing machine (machine C, which was used for
bed linen and towels) were cultured for ESBL-producing micro-
organisms. Machines B and C repeatedly tested negative for the
outbreak strain.
Proving the washing machine as a potential source of
transmission
An experiment with machine A was designed to (1) investigate the
potential role in transmission of the outbreak strain and (2) design
a laundering protocol without risk of transmission of ESBL-E. This
experiment (Table 1) consisted of 2 different schedules performed
twice (session 1 and 2). We obtained 40 samples of several sites of
the machine and feces-contaminated cotton cloths from an
outbreak case during the laundering schedules and cultured them
for ESBL-K. pneumoniae. The machine, including the filter, was
not additionally cleaned prior to the experiment. In session 1 of
schedule 2, the cloth remained ESBL-K. pneumoniae positive after
laundering at 30°C. After laundering at ≥60°C in both schedules,
the ESBL-K. pneumoniae was not detected in the cloth. However,
in session 2 of schedule 1, the ESBL-K. pneumoniae was detected
after washing at 60°C in the filter of the machine, a site where
debris may also accumulate. Because the filter is situated down-
stream of the basket in which the clothes were placed, the risk
of contamination from the filter to the basket in the consecutive
laundering cycle was considered very low. In response to the find-
ing this suspected source of transmission, a reinforced laundering
protocol was implemented. Clothing of and medical aids used by
different patients had to be washed separately, on the full wash
cycle time at ≥60°C. In exceptional cases, in which certain clothes
could not be washed at 60°C, 30–40°C was allowed, only if an addi-
tional ‘empty’ basket washing program at 95°Cwas performed sub-
sequently. Due to compliance issues, this exception was prohibited
after a few months. Finally, the rubber ring and exterior surfaces of
the door and buttons had to be cleaned and disinfected after every
washing program.
Outbreak cases and microbiological findings
Although the ESBL-K. pneumoniae isolates found in the outbreak
cases and machine A showed identical AFLP and MLVA patterns,
susceptibility to gentamicin differed (Table 2). Therefore, a
gentamicin-susceptible and gentamicin-resistant clinical isolate
as well as 2 environmental isolates were selected for additional
typing using wgMLST. The results showed that all 4 isolates were
of sequence type (ST)307. The isolates susceptible to gentamicin
(MIC≤ 1mg/L) cultured from machine A and patient 1 (Table 2)
were genetically very closely related, differing in 3 core genes. The iso-
lates resistant to gentamicin (MIC,>8mg/L), cultured frommachine
A and patient 7 (Table 2) were also closely related with differences in
Table 1. Washing Machine Experiment With Feces-Contaminated Clothes of a
Patient Colonized With the ESBL-K. pneumoniae Outbreak Strain
Experimental Set-Up (in chronological order,
from top to bottom)
Culture Result
Session 1 Session 2
Schedule 1
3 sitesa machine prior to washing at 60°C Pos (filter) Neg
Feces of patient prior to washing at 60°C Pos Pos
3 sitesa machine after washing at 60°C Neg Pos (filter)
Piece of cotton cloth after washing at 60°C Neg Neg
Schedule 2
3 sitesa of machine prior to washing at 30°C Neg Neg
Feces of patient prior to washing at 30°C Pos Pos
3 sitesa of machine after washing at 30°C Neg Neg
Piece of cotton cloth after washing at 30°C Pos Neg
3 sitesa of machine after washing at 90°C Neg Neg
Piece of cotton cloth after washing at 90°C Neg Neg
Note. Pos, positive; Neg, negative. Experiments were carried out with washing machine A.
a(1) Filter: drain pump filter andwater filter; (2) inner surface: rubber and basket; and (3) outer
surface: control buttons, door handle and detergent drawer.
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2 28-09-2016 UN, RE 49 No Yes S NP
3 10-10-2016 RE 67 No No S NP
4 10-10-2016 RE 292 No No S NP
5 10-10-2016 RE, UN, TH 47 Yes No R NP
6 10-10-2016 UN, RE 133 No Yes S NP









8 11-10-2016 RE, WS 151 Yes No S NP
9 01-11-2016 RE, UN 168 Yes No S NP
10 08-11-2016 RE 153 Yes No R NP
11 27-12-2016 RE, UN 133 Yes No R NP
















Note. UN, urine; RE, rectum; TH, throat; BL, blood; WS, wound secretion; IS, inner surface of washing machine A (ie, rubber and basket); OS, outer surface of washing machine A (ie, control
buttons, door handle and detergent drawer); F, filter (ie, drain pump filter and water filter of washing machine A); NA, not applicable; NP, not performed.
aPatients infected and/or colonized with the ESBL-K. pneumoniae outbreak strain.


























Screening culture of negative patients
Infection prevention measures a b c d e f g
Fig. 1. Timeline of admissions to the rehabilitation ward of patients colonized or infected with ESBL-K. pneumoniae outbreak strain. Light grey bar, patient is admit-
ted without having a culture with the outbreak strain. Dark grey bar, patient is admitted and known to be either colonized or infected with the outbreak strain based
on a positive culture. Diagonally striped bar, admitted to Erasmus Medical Center, an acute-care hospital nearby the rehabilitation center. No bar, discharged.
(a) Screening culture of all patients; (b) cleaning and disinfection of ward, cohorting of patients, audit and environmental cultures; (c) taking washing machine
temporarily out of service for feces-contaminated medical aids and clothes; (d) reinforcement of laundering protocol; (e) environmental cultures; (f) audit of
high-risk processes; and (g) extensive cleaning of sanitary rooms. Note. BL, blood; UN, urine; RE, rectum; WS, wound secretion.
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only 5 core genes. Despite the fact that all isolates were of ST307, the
gentamicin-susceptible and gentamicin-resistant clusters differed in
39 core genes, which is beyond the defined cluster alert of 15
differences. Genome analysis using CARD revealed that all 4 isolates
contained the ESBL-genes blaCTX-M-15 and blaSHV-28, and also the
aac(6’)-Ib-cr gene, conferring resistance to tobramycin, amikacin,
kanamycin, ciprofloxacin, and norfloxacin.16 Notably, the gentami-
cin-resistant isolates carried an aac(3)-IIa gene, which is described
to confer resistance to gentamicin.17,18 Moreover, the gentamicin-
resistant isolates carried an additional plasmid that was not present
in the gentamicin-susceptible isolates.
Discussion
An outbreak of an ESBL-K. pneumoniae ST307 occurred on a sin-
gle ward in a rehabilitation center, and the household washing
machine used for laundering feces-contaminated patient clothing
and medical aids played a key role in transmission of the outbreak
strain. The following findings support this hypothesis: (1) The
household washing machine was repeatedly positive for the out-
break strain during the outbreak period. (2) Prior to recognition
of the outbreak, soiled personal clothing items from different
patients were regularly washed simultaneously at 30–40°C with
laundry AOB-free detergent, risking cross-contamination of
clothes from a contaminated piece to a noncontaminated piece
or from persistent contamination of the inside of the washing
machine, and our experiment revealed that the outbreak strain
could still be cultured from a cotton cloth after washing at 30°C.
(3) The outbreak was contained after the reinforcement of proto-
cols on the use of the washing machine. However, we could not
determine how many transmissions were directly related to the
use of this washing machine.
Several studies on household washing machines demonstrate
that laundering at temperatures below 60ºC allow gram-negative
bacteria to survive in greywater and cloths.19–21 This can lead to
formation of biofilms, which offers survival and growing condi-
tions for bacteria and subsequent spreading to different laundry
items.22 Persistence of biofilms during consecutive washing cycles
might have contributed to transmission of the outbreak strain
between patients. Scott and Bloomfield23,24 showed in 2 different
studies that several gram-negative bacteria, including Klebsiella
pneumoniae, survived and even increased in number on soiled
cloths after a slow drying process at room temperature.
Spreading of the outbreak strain via dried patient clothing could
have contributed as well. The potential role of laundering in trans-
mission of bacteria is reasoned upon in several studies, and a few
outbreaks with Bacillus cereus via hospital linen with the potential
role of washing machines have been described.25–27 However, no
studies on outbreaks with multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
via a household washing machine had been described until
recently, when Schmithausen et al28 published a report about
the transmission of ESBL-K. oxytoca among newborns.
According to Sinner's cycle, 4 parameters are interconnected in the
reduction in microbial contamination of textile items in the
laundering process: mechanical and chemical action, duration, and
temperature.29 The contribution of each parameter is not entirely clear
and differs between type of textiles and machines, for example,
between household and industrial washing machines. Studies on
the domestic setting with household washing machines demonstrate
that decontamination efficacy is increasing with temperature; 1 study
showed a sufficient 7-log reduction of bacterial load at 60°C.30
Prolonging the wash cycle and the use of AOB-containing detergents
could compensate for a low washing temperature in the inactivation
or removal of microorganisms.21,31 However, because AOB-
containing detergents often cannot be used due to their damaging
action on colored personal clothing, temperature and duration are still
the most important factors. A heated drying process, using tumble
drying or ironing, can additionally decrease bacterial load.32–34
To our knowledge, this is the first report of an outbreak with
ESBL-K. pneumoniae assumingly transmitted via a household
washing machine in a rehabilitation center. According to the
DutchWIP 2014 guideline for laundry of hospital linen,35 the laun-
dering process must meet the norms of the NEN-EN 1406536 and
NEN-EN-ISO 9001/C1,37 which only professional laundry services
can achieve. Currently, no specific national guidelines are available
for laundering in rehabilitation centers.
The outbreak strain belonged to ST307, which has recently been
identified as a potential emerging virulent clone due to characteristics
that promote long-term survival and growth in environments outside
humans.38 The wgMLST analysis on 2 patient isolates and 2 isolates
obtained from the washing machine revealed a small difference of 39
core genes between the isolates that were susceptible and those that
were resistant to gentamicin. Analysis of the genome data showed that
the isolates (n= 2) resistant to gentamicin harbored an aac(3)-IIa
gene sequence, in the literature associated with resistance to gentami-
cin, among other aminoglycosides.17,39 This can explain the difference
in susceptibility to gentamicin between the isolates because the
gentamicin-susceptible isolates (n= 2) lacked this gene sequence.
The sequences of the strains are highly similar, so the outbreak strain
may have acquired or lost this particular aac(3)-IIa gene (speculatively
located on a plasmid) prior to or during the outbreak period, and both
strains may have spread among the patients simultaneously.
However, this issue remains unresolved.
Our study has some limitations. First, we did not use an enrich-
ment broth, except for the cultures of the cloths in the experiment
with the washingmachine. Therefore, wemay havemissed potential
environmental sources, as well as patients colonized with low levels
of ESBL-K. pneumoniae. Second, only a selection of isolates was ana-
lyzed with wgMLST, due to costs.
Controlling an outbreak in a rehabilitation center is challeng-
ing because the risk of spread is high due to utilization of shared
devices and therapy and recreation rooms for a long period of
time, as well as to a patient population with fecal incontinence.
However, even in this setting, we showed that it was possible
to control the outbreak.
In conclusion, our data strongly suggest that the washingmachine
played a key role in transmission of the outbreak strain. We assume
that this transmission route may also occur in other healthcare insti-
tutions, where feces-contaminated clothes are washed in household
washing machines. In addition, we stress the need for development
and implementation of feasible infection prevention and outbreak
management guidelines for rehabilitation centers.
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